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29 Arb Int'l 153 (2013)

Convention Violations and Investment
Claims
by WILLIAM W. PARK*
I. RIGHTS IN SEARCH OF REMEDIES
In theory, treaty commitments remain a foundation of international law, often
expressed in the adage pacta sunt servanda: ‘agreements are to be kept’.1 In practice,
however, some treaty violations remain without realistic sanctions. Here as
elsewhere, the divergence between theory and practice remains greater in practice
than in theory.
Mature legal thinking implicates more than one principle. The Convention
requires that signatory nations give effect to the treaty. Article II and Article III
contain mandatory language, stating that contracting states ‘shall recognize’
(respectively) arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. If a national constitution
so requires, giving effect to agreements and awards might call for implementing
legislation. If a country fails to implement the Convention, its national courts
might well look to domestic constitutional law rather than treaty provisions. Such
failure to implement the Convention nevertheless constitutes a breach of treaty
obligation.
Similar lines of analysis obtain when national judicial decisions interfere unduly
with respect to the New York Convention.2 However, the availability of remedies in
such cases remains highly fact specific.3 In some instances, investment treaties offer
a way to close the gap between theory and practice, permitting investors to bring

*
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2
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Professor of Law, Boston University. President, London Court of International Arbitration. Adapted from
Arbitration of International Business Disputes ch. II-D-5 (2d ed., 2012).
See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 579–609 (6th ed., 2003); J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations
317–45 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed., 1963); F.A. Mann, Studies in International Law 327–359 (1973).
For a decision confirming, in the context of an investment treaty, that governmental measures include judicial
decisions, see Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. U.S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Interim
Award on Jurisdiction, 5 Jan. 2001.
In summary, Article II of the Convention provides that national courts should respect the agreement to
arbitrate, and Article III imposes a duty to recognize and enforce awards. See Article Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 Jun. 1958, 3 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
Twenty-four countries originally signed the Convention. The rest have joined by accession or succession. The
most recent ratifications bring to 148 the total number of countries bound by the treaty.
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private actions against a host country rather than relying on government-togovernment measures.
Not all failure to respect the New York Convention fits within the framework of
investment treaties. Many clear Convention violations remain without remedy, due
to the absence of any relevant ‘investment’ providing the jurisdictional hook on
which to hang a claim.
The contours of national respect for the New York Convention might be
addressed by comparing two strands of analysis. The first, represented by the
ICISD decision Saipem v. Bangladesh, implicate arbitral tribunal jurisdiction with
respect to domestic court decisions that allegedly run afoul of the New York
Convention. By contrast, in another line of cases no practical mechanism seems to
exist for challenge to the invocation of parochial American procedure to defeat
award recognition under the Convention.
The modest aspiration of this note lies in an exploration of how and why the two
types of cases differ. As we shall see, a key distinction lies in the existence of an
‘investment’ to trigger arbitration of treaty breaches by the country allegedly
failing to respect the New York Convention.

II. RECOURSE TO INVESTMENT TREATIES: SAIPEM V.
BANGLADESH
(a) The Underlying Dispute
In March 2007, an arbitral tribunal opened the door to a damages award for
breach of the New York Convention.4 An Italian construction company (Saipem)
had contracted to build a gas pipeline in northeastern Bangladesh. The
counterparty was a state entity, the Bangladesh Oil Gas & Mineral Corporation,
commonly called Petrobangla. Ultimately, the transaction went sour. The
contractor claimed additional costs that Petrobangla refused to pay. Controversy
also arose with respect to return of a warranty bond and retention monies
requested by the Italians.
Saipem referred its claim to arbitration, pursuant to a clause in the parties’
agreement that provided for dispute resolution in Dhakar under the Rules of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). An arbitral tribunal was constituted,5
and proceeded to render awards in favour of Saipem with respect to jurisdiction,
liability and quantum of damages.6 During and after the proceedings, courts in
Bangladesh made various orders with respect to the arbitration. The Supreme

4
5

6

Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case ARB/05/07, 21 Mar. 2007. The tribunal was
composed of Professor Kaufmann-Kohler, Professor Christoph Schreuer and Sir Philip Otton.
The eminent tribunal included Dr Werner Melis as Chairman, and Professor Riccardo Luzzatto and Professor
Ian Brownlie. The laws of Bangladesh were applicable to the merits of the dispute. English was the language
of the arbitration.
In May 2003, the tribunal found Petrobangla to have breached its obligations and awarded Saipem USD 6
million plus Euro (EUR) 110,000 plus interest and return of the bond.
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Court issued an injunction restraining Saipem from continuing with the ICC
arbitration. Ultimately, that Court ruled that there was ‘no award in the eye of the
law’ finding that the arbitral proceedings were illegal and without jurisdiction.7
(b) The ICSID Proceeding
In response to the alleged interference with the ICC arbitration by Bangladeshi
courts, Saipem filed a second arbitration, this one under the rules of the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). This new
claim (for USD 12.5 million plus relief concerning the warranty bond) was brought
pursuant to the bilateral investment treaty between Bangladesh and Italy (the
Italo-Bangladeshi BIT), with the respondent as the Republic of Bangladesh itself,
rather than the state agency. Article 5 of the BIT provides that investments may
not be expropriated (nor subject to measures equivalent to expropriation) without
prompt, adequate and effective compensation.
Contending that immaterial rights can be expropriated, Saipem asserted that
Bangladesh had expropriated not only its contract claims, but also an entitlement
to arbitrate under the ICC Rules. According to Saipem, this was covered by the
Italo-Bangladesh BIT, which in Article 1 extends its protection to any ‘right
accruing by law or by contract’. In response, Bangladesh raised jurisdictional
objections based on both the BIT itself and Article 25 of the ICSID Convention,
which extends jurisdiction to ‘any legal dispute arising directly out of an
investment’ between the host state and the foreign investor.
The ICSID Tribunal accepted jurisdiction.8 In so doing, the arbitrators had to
address multiple questions related to the nature of investments and the type of fact
patterns capable of constituting an expropriation.
Noting that the notion of investment in the Italo-Bangladeshi BIT includes
‘credit for sums of money’,9 the Tribunal construed those words to cover rights
under an award ordering payment of amounts due to the prevailing party. In so
doing, the tribunal focused on the rights arising out of the underlying contractual
relationship. These rights were found to have been crystallized by the ICC
award.10 Consequently, the arbitrators did not need to make a final ruling on the
argument that the arbitration agreement itself constituted a financial right covered
by Article 1 of the BIT.11
Having determined that Saipem had made an investment as defined under the
Italo-Bangladeshi BIT, the Tribunal went on to find that the facts as alleged by the
Claimant were capable of constituting an expropriation under Article 5 of the BIT.
The essence of the allegation was that an unlawful disruption and a de facto
annulment of the ICC Arbitration by Bangladeshi courts deprived Saipem of the
7

8
9
10
11

Agreement of 20 Mar. 1990 between Government of the Republic of Italy and Government of the People’s
Republic of Bangladesh on the Promotion and Protection of Investments. The treaty entered into force on 20
Sep. 1994.
Jurisdictional Award of 21 Mar. 2007, ICSID Case. No. ARB/05/07.
Bangladesh-Italy BIT, Art. 1(1)(c).
Jurisdictional Award of 21 Mar. 2007, paras. 125–127.
Ibid., at para. 128.
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amounts awarded in the ICC arbitration, thus amounting to an illegal
expropriation.
Finally, the Tribunal rejected the contention that the substance of Saipem’s
claim constituted a private contract action rather than an investment treaty claim.
Bangladesh had argued that the claim was nothing more than a contract action
‘dressed as a treaty claim’. In response, the Tribunal noted that Saipem did not
request relief under its agreement with Petrobangla, but rather claimed that the
alleged breach of the New York Convention constituted a violation of the
protection mandated for foreign investors under the investment treaty.12
In its award on jurisdiction, the Tribunal determined that the alleged violation
of the New York Convention could constitute a breach of the investment treaty.
This conclusion was confirmed in the award on the merits. The Tribunal found
that the Bangladeshi actions were contrary to international law, in particular to the
principle of abuse of rights and the New York Convention; and hence Bangladesh
was found to have expropriated Saipem’s investment in contravention of the BIT.13
Doubtless the award will serve as a springboard for future claims related to the
New York Convention.
Not all state practices that disregard the Convention will be actionable, however.
Some investment in the offending country must provide a jurisdictional
underpinning for actions against the breaching state. Breach without remedy will
likely continue in instances exemplified by certain American decisions that invoke
notions of forum non conveniens and lack of ‘minimum contacts’ to justify failure
to recognize arbitral awards. To these cases, we now turn our attention.

III. JURISDICTION AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS
(a) An American Trilogy
In many countries, implementation of international conventions implicates an
intricate interplay of the treaty text with constitutional mandates and federal
statutes. This complexity presents itself crisply in three American federal appellate
decisions: Base Metal,14 Glencore Grain15 and Monégasque de Reassurances,16 which
under one line of argument place the United States in breach of its obligations
under the New York Convention.

12
13
14
15

16

‘[T]he essence of Saipem’s case is that courts of Bangladesh acted in violation of the New York Convention
. . . ’ Ibid. at para. 141.
Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7), Award (30 June 2009) ¶170.
Cf. Ruth Teitelbaum, Case Report on Saipem v. Bangladesh, 26:2 Arbitration International 313 (2010).
Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC ‘Novokuznetsky Aluminium Factory’, 283 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2002).
Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1122 & n. 5 (9th Cir. 2002), upholding
a district court decision refusing to recognize an award made against an Indian rice exporter deemed not to
be present in or having assets in the district.
Monégasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 498–501 (2d Cir. 2002).
See also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248–249 (1981).
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In each instance, the court dismissed a petition to confirm a foreign arbitral
award subject to the New York Convention. In the first two, courts concluded that
it lacked personal jurisdiction over the foreign respondent, and thus could not
enforce the awards. The third case, Monégasque de Reassurances, decided that award
confirmation had been sought in an unsuitable forum and thus had to be refused.
With respect to all of these cases, any investment treaty remedy for breach of the
New York Convention (a matter to be explored below) appears conceptually farfetched. Bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, as well as the ICSID
Convention, presuppose an investment within the country whose responsibility has
been invoked. Without some investment, the jurisdictional predicate for arbitration
remains absent.
Unlike the Saipem case, no investment had been made in the United States by the
prevailing party in the arbitrations which gave rise to the trilogy of above-cited
cases. Indeed, the heart of these decisions lies in the court’s inability to find
connections between the arbitration’s winner and the United States such as to
justify (under American principles) consideration of a recognition request.
(b) Interplay of National Law and the New York Convention
These controversial cases highlight the contours for interaction of the New York
Convention and national law. All three decisions came as a surprise to an
arbitration community, among which considerable scholarly comment has been
generated.17 Moreover, a report by the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York suggests that a sound basis exists for enforcement of New York Convention
awards solely on the basis of assets located within the forum.18
To understand what happened, one must recall that the US Constitution speaks
of ‘supreme law of the land’ with respect to three (not one) sources of legal
authority: the Constitution itself, federal statutes and international treaties.19
While the Constitution has long been deemed to trump other sources of law, 20 the
interaction between treaties and statutes remains less clear.21 Although not free
from scholarly debate,22 acts of Congress and treaties would normally remain on
17
18

19

20
21

22

See, e.g., William W. Park & Alexander Yanos, Treaty Obligations and National Law, 58 Hastings L. Rev. 251
(2006);
The International Commercial Disputes Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Lack of Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens As Defenses To The Enforcement Of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Apr. 2005),
reprinted 15 Am. Rev. Intl. Arb. 407 (2006). [Hereinafter New York City Bar Report]. The Report suggests that
the holding in Glencore is correct, but questions the reasoning and result in Base Metal. The Report also argues
that an agreement to arbitrate in one New York Convention country is not sufficient to constitute consent to
enforcement in other Convention states, and that forum non conveniens should not generally serve as a
ground for dismissing an action to confirm or enforce a Convention award.
Article VI, Section 2 of the US Constitution reads as follows: ‘The Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land.’
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1957).
See generally, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920), upholding the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918,
which gave effect to an earlier treaty between the United States and Great Britain providing for the
protection of birds that travelled between the United States and Canada.
See Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. (2006) 1479.
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the same level. One might prevail over the other due to a ‘later in time’ rule or
some indication of congressional intent, but not to any inherent value derived from
status as either treaty or legislation. Conflict over application of treaties has been
addressed in contexts as mundane as real estate taxation23 and as emotionally
charged as capital punishment.24
According to rules of international law, neither a constitutional mandate nor the
enactment of a statute provides an excuse for a treaty violation.25 Prevailing opinion
holds that an act wrongful under the law of nations remains so even if a nation’s
internal law deems otherwise.26 Observers are thus led to a closer examination of
what the New York Convention has to say about award recognition.
(c) Construing the New York Convention
(i) Rules of Procedure where Relied Upon
The New York Convention mandates award recognition subject to a narrowly
drafted litany of defences.27 None of these includes either lack of ‘minimum
contacts’ (the ground for non-recognition in Base Metal and Glencore Grain) or forum
non conveniens (invoked in Monégasque de Reassurances).
The Convention does, however, provide in Article III for award recognition ‘in
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied
upon’. Until recently, most observers considered that this provision related to the
form of enforcement, not the conditions for enforcement.28 Contracting states
certainly possess discretion with respect to minor ministerial matters, such as the
amount of filing fees or rules about where enforcement motions must be brought.
However, no clear support exists for the proposition that the ‘procedure where
23

24
25

26

27

28

See Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 1125 94 Stat. 2682, 2690 (codified
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), which provides that no treaty shall exempt or reduce the tax otherwise
imposed on gain by foreigners from disposition of American real estate.
See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998), Medellin v. Texas (cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 2129, 2007), Avena and
other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), 2004 I.C.J. No. 128, 43 I.L.M. 581 (2004).
See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Art. 27, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (‘A party may
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is
without prejudice to article 46.’).
Under Art. III of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, ‘[t]he characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is
governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act
as lawful by internal law.’ Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 10) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Report]. See also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 111 cmt. a (1987).
These defences relate both to procedural fairness (invalid arbitration agreement, lack of opportunity to
present one’s case, arbitrator excess of jurisdiction, and irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal) and to
the forum’s public policy. Different considerations may obtain in respect to awards rendered in the United
States, even when the New York Convention applies because the dispute implicates international commerce
or involves foreign parties and is thus considered ‘non domestic’. See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys ‘R’
Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997). With respect to awards not covered by the New York Convention,
other standards would apply. See, e.g., Int’l Bechtel Co. v. Dep’t of Civil Aviation of Dubai, 360 F. Supp. 2d 136,
137-38 (D.D.C. 2005).
See Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958, 236–41 (1981). Hereinafter, ‘Van den
Berg’.
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relied upon’ language was intended to serve as a backdoor escape from recognition
of legitimate foreign awards.
To illustrate, determining where to seek award enforcement takes on a special
dimension in countries with a federal system. In the United States, enforcement
motions are normally brought in federal (not state) courts.29 By contrast, in
Switzerland such actions will be heard by the cantonal (not federal) judiciary.30
The difference relates simply to enforcement modalities, not conditions that serve
to bar recognition itself.
Read in context, the ‘rules of procedure’ language in Convention Article III
gives contracting states latitude in fashioning the practical mechanics of award
enforcement. The provision indicates that the process for obtaining award
enforcement or recognition is flexible, to be determined by local procedures. This
language relates to how recognition will be granted, not whether recognition will be
granted at all.
(ii) The approach in Monégasque de Reassurances.
The decision in Monégasque de Reassurances took a different view, however, seizing
upon the reference to ‘rules of procedure’ to justify invocation of forum non
conveniens, and recognizing limitations only with respect to measures that
discriminate against foreign awards when compared with domestic arbitral
decisions.31
In taking this approach, the court included an extended discussion of the United
States Supreme Court characterization of forum non conveniens as ‘procedural
rather than substantive,’ emphasizing that the doctrine is applied in the
enforcement of domestic awards as well. The conclusion in Monegasque was that the
Convention’s only limitation on procedural rules was ‘the requirement that the
procedures applied in foreign cases would not be substantially more onerous than
those applied in domestic cases’.32
(iii) Drafting History
In concluding that the New York Convention imposes no limitations other than
non-discrimination on procedural rules at the enforcement forum, the court in
Monégasque de Reassurances seems to have gone astray as a matter of both logic and
history. Relying on the drafting history of the New York Convention, the court
suggested that the non-discrimination language was proposed by Belgium, and

29
30

31
32

In addition, a respondent may remove an enforcement action from state to federal court. See 9 U.S.C. §§
203–05.
On the enforcement of a foreign award under Art. 194 of the Swiss LDIP/IPRG, see Paolo Michel Patocchi
& Cesare Jermini, Foreign Arbitral Awards, in International Arbitration in Switzerland 625–675 (Stphen Berti ed.,
Helbing & Lichtenhahn/Kluwer, 2000).
Monégasque de Reassurances v. Naftogaz Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2002) at 496.
Ibid. at 496.
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supported by the United States, only after efforts to establish uniform standards
had failed.33
History does not support the court’s conclusions. To the contrary, the debate on
Article III confirms that the reference to ‘rules of procedure’ relates simply to
formalities for an application to confirm or enforce, including fees and the pro
forma structure of the request. There is no evidence that the language was
intended to incorporate doctrines that permit or require courts to prune their
dockets in normal commercial litigation.
As an initial matter, it is important to remember that the relevant language in
Convention Article III originated not with the Belgian delegate,34 or any other
delegate, but was instead taken verbatim from the predecessor to the New York
Convention.35 Article 1 of the 1927 Geneva Arbitration Convention provided that
‘an arbitral award . . . shall be recognized as binding and shall be enforced in
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied
upon’.36 In contrast, the Belgian proposal that the Second Circuit referred to would
have resulted in a substantially different version of the New York Convention. Each
country would have enforced foreign arbitral awards in the identical manner as for
domestic awards.37
More significantly, the comments from delegates most closely involved with the
adoption of the present Convention’s wording show an expectation at odds with
the Second Circuit’s interpretation of that article. For example, the representative
from the United Kingdom (author of the prohibition on fees more onerous than
those applicable to domestic awards) explained that the purpose of his proposal
was to ensure that a foreign award that met the conditions of the Convention
should be ‘enforceable without unnecessary inconvenience’.38 Similarly, the report
of the Secretary General of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
highlights that reference to ‘rules of procedure’ was not an attempt to incorporate
by reference all of the arcane rules of procedure applicable in each jurisdiction in
which the Convention would be applicable, but rather to refer to the basic method
by which a party must file an application to have an arbitral award recognized or
enforced.39
Thus, the Convention’s drafting history indicates that it was not meant to
authorize courts to provide open-ended grounds on which to dismiss recognition of
otherwise valid awards. To the contrary, the prevailing view supports the
33

34

35
36
37
38
39

The chief source of the Second Circuit’s information seems to have been a law review article, Leonard V.
Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L.J. 1049 (1961).
Indeed, the comments of the Belgian delegate actually run counter to the argument that Article III of the
draft Convention was concerned principally with making the award operative. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/
SR.10, at 7 (27 May 1958).
Van den Berg, at 234.
1927 Geneva Convention, Art. I.
See U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.10, at 5.
Ibid. at 7 (comments of Mr Wortley).
The Secretary-General, Note on the Comments on Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 6 Mar. 1958, ¶¶ 7–8, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/2 (6 Mar. 1958).
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exclusivity of the reasons for refusal of recognition as set forth in Convention
Articles V and VI, which relate to basic procedural fairness, substantive public
policy and adjournment in deference to foreign court proceedings.40 Although a
Convention country can certainly set up ministerial conditions for award
enforcement, such as making the application to the correct court or paying a
reasonable filing fee, the Convention drafters did not expect the recognition forum
to establish outright procedural bars to award confirmation.
(d) National Practice
The practice of countries other than the United States provides little support for
the acceptance of local procedural impediments to enforcement of New York
Convention awards. Except for claims against foreign sovereigns,41 few nonAmerican jurisdictions condition enforcement of Convention awards on a link
with the transaction, the parties or their property.42 Many Western legal systems
exercise jurisdiction without regard to the type of minimum contacts required by
the United States,43 and international law generally prohibits invocation of a
country’s internal law to eviscerate its international agreement.44
(e) Public Interests and Proper Parties
Unlike limits on personal jurisdiction, the doctrine of forum non conveniens does
not rest on constitutional underpinnings,45 but derives instead from a court’s
inherent power to manage its own docket.46 Once described as ‘a supervening
venue provision’ that comes into play when a trial court declines jurisdiction,47
forum non conveniens implicates a multistage analysis. No level of the analysis

40
41

42
43

44

45
46
47

Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997).
Questions of sovereign immunity pose different concerns, since the objection of the respondent state relates
to jurisdiction under principle of international (not just local) law. For example, before Swiss courts will execute
an award against the assets of a foreign sovereign, an ‘internal connection’ (Binnenbeziehung) must exist between
Switzerland and either the parties or the transaction. See Circulaire du Department Federal de Justice et
Police, Jurisprudence des Autorités Administratives de la Conféderation 224 (26 Nov. 1979). The principle
was applied to one aspect of the LIAMCO saga. See Socialist Libyan Arab Popular Jamarihiya v. Libyan American
Oil Co., Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] 19 Jun. 1980 , 20 I.L.M. 151, 159–60. See also Georges R.
Delaume, Economic Development and Sovereign Immunity, Am. J. Intl. L. 319, 340 (1985).
New York City Bar Report, pages 6–7, suggests that several countries (including China and Japan) impose
such restrictions.
See French Code Civil, Art. 14 C. civ. [Fr.] (jurisdiction based on the nationality of the plaintiff); German
Zivilprozeßordnung [ZPO] [civil procedure statute] Art. 23 (Ger.) (jurisdiction on the basis of property
alone); English CPR Part 6.20 (jurisdiction based on applicable substantive law). Compare the position in
Switzerland, where applicability of Swiss law requires courts to accept jurisdiction in the context of a forum
selection clause. See Art. 5, Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé. See also § 1062 ZPO.
See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 311(3) (1987). For a discussion
of a related (but conceptually distinct) point, see Jan Paulsson, May a State Invoke its Internal Law to Repudiate
Consent to International Commercial Arbitration? 2 Arb. Intl. 90 (1986).
See generally Edward L. Barrett, Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Cal. L. Rev. 380, 386–89 (1947).
See Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488, 498–501 (2d Cir. 2002).
See also Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981).
For a recent discussion of the doctrine as a means to defend against lawsuits in federal courts, see David W.
Rivkin & Suzanne M. Grosso, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine on the Move, 5 Bus. Law Intl. 1 (2004).
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implicates bright lines.48 Determining whether to honour the plaintiff’s choice of
forum requires first a finding on whether an adequate alternative forum exists. If
so, courts may proceed to balance what have been called ‘the private and public
interests’ that bear on where the case should be adjudicated.49 Consequently,
courts do not dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds when no adequate
alternative forum exists, or when a balancing of interests indicates that dismissal
would not be appropriate.50
Under a proper application of these principles, the instances will be few and far
between when the doctrine of forum non conveniens justifies dismissal of a motion
to confirm a New York Convention award. The breach of a treaty obligation is no
light matter, and the United States has a vital public interest in following through
with its international commitments. Treaties should normally outweigh the other
interest factors (public and private) that militate in favour of dismissal.51
Rare as they may be, some instances will exist when courts may be justified in
refusing, on forum non conveniens grounds, to recognize an award covered by the
New York Convention. One example might be found in the need to determine
what entities were properly subject to the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, a problem that
existed in very facts that gave rise to Monégasque de Reassurances.52 We remember that
the court upheld dismissal of an action brought by a foreign reinsurer that had
been subrogated to rights against a Ukrainian entity called ‘Naftogaz,’ which was
arguably an instrumentality of the Government of the Ukraine. On the face of the
arbitration agreement, the state was not a party to the arbitration agreement.
The question of ‘who is the proper party’ is not uncommon to international or
domestic arbitration, and arises frequently in connection with actions against
so-called non-signatories.53 Courts must often determine whether arbitration is

48
49
50
51

52
53

See Gross v. British Broad. Corp., 386 F.3d 224, 230 (2d Cir. 2004).
Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 246 (emphasis added).
See Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2001).
For example, under this analysis, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Melton v. Oy Nautor Ab should not stand given
that the respondent in that case had assets in the district and it was unreasonable to compel the petitioner to
travel to Finland to get paid. No. 97-15395, 1998 WL 613798, at **2–3 (9th Cir. 4 Sep. 1998).
311 F.3d 488, 498–501 (2d Cir. 2002).
The term ‘nonsignatory’ has long served as a useful shorthand reference to persons whose right or obligation
to arbitrate may be problematic, even though the FAA provides for enforcement of an unsigned written
provision to arbitrate, such as an exchange of telegrams, emails or sales forms. Lack of signature does not in
itself, however, taint an arbitration clause under the FAA. When enforcement under the New York
Convention is in question, the issue becomes more complex. Some agreements to arbitration must be signed,
while others need not be. The nub of discord centres on punctuation, with the focus of attention on the
comma preceding the phrase ‘signed by parties’ in Convention Art. II. Some courts interpret the signature
requirement to apply only to the words ‘an arbitration agreement’ found just before the comma. Others apply
the signature requirement to everything in the early part of the sentence, including reference to arbitral
clauses in contracts. The answer may be significant where the Convention provides the only basis for federal
courts to exercise jurisdiction. See Kahn Lucas Lancaster v. Lark Int’l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210, 218 (2d Cir. 1999)
(finding that ‘signed by the parties’ applied to arbitral clauses encapsulated in broader contracts as well as
separate arbitration agreements).
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appropriate with respect to a person that did not agree to arbitrate. Parentsubsidiary relationships provide fertile ground for disagreements,54 leading courts
occasionally to extend the burdens and benefits of an arbitration clause. In such
instances, courts must be rigorous in their investigation of the parties’ real
intentions on the existence or scope of arbitral authority,55 resisting the temptation
to apply vague verbal formulae independent of the commercial context.56
In Monégasque de Reassurances, the question arose whether the Ukraine could be
made liable on an award by reason of piercing the corporate veil between the
government and a state-owned corporation.57 The district court felt this issue was
better decided by the Ukrainian courts than those in New York and dismissed the
request to confirm the award.58
The appellate court agreed.59 Dismissal of the confirmation motion was held
justifiable not only because the Ukrainian courts were deemed to provide an
adequate forum for resolution of the corporate veil question, but also because the
Ukraine had a more significant interest than the United States in the award
enforcement action.60
The aspect of Monégasque de Reassurances that has concerned some arbitration
lawyers lies not so much in the case itself, but the danger that other courts might
misapply its problematic dictum concerning Article III of the New York
Convention. An unduly broad scope for ‘rules of procedure’ would create a risk of
excessive disregard of awards.61 Like many cases that are rightly decided on their
facts, Monegasque has announced principles that must be handled with great
caution.
(f) Consent to Jurisdiction Clauses
Pragmatic reactions can be expected to the risk that awards recognition becomes
contingent on the loser’s ‘minimum contacts’ with the United States.62 One
response might be the routine inclusion of consent to jurisdiction clauses in
international arbitration agreements.63 As the market reacts to the fact that the
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See Ceska Sporitelna, a.s. v. Unisys Corp., No. 96–4152, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15435, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10,
1996) (remarking that the general rule is ‘that only signatories to a contract can be bound by an arbitration
clause found within the contract’); Thomson-CSF v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995)
(recognizing five exceptions to the general rule that arbitration agreements do not bind non-signatories:
incorporation by reference, assumption, agency, piercing of corporate veil and estoppel).
See Sphere Drake Ins. v. All Am. Ins., 256 F.3d 587, 589–591 (7th Cir. 2001).
For a problematic case in this connection, see, e.g., Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co. Ltd., 398 F.3d 205 (2d Cir.
2005). Cf. JSC Surgutneftegaz v. Harvard College, 2005 WL 1863676 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Monegasque de Reassurances v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 2002).
Ibid. at 493.
Ibid. at 500–501.
Monegasque, 311 F.3d at 498–501.
Ibid. at 495.
By contrast, problems raised by forum non conveniens (as evidenced in Monégasque de Reassurances) remain less
amenable to contractual remedy, given that public interests as well as private affect a court’s determinations
on the appropriateness of forum.
For cases evidencing a longstanding benevolent attitude toward judicial jurisdiction clauses, see M/S Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 16 (1972) and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 596 (1991).
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United States is not that arbitration-friendly, an evolution in arbitration clauses
can be expected to include language making clear that the parties, at least ex ante,
wish to eliminate the surprise obstacles resulting from uncertain fact patterns.64
The direction of such clauses could take different routes. It might be that some
clauses explicitly provide for awards to be recognized in any court of a contracting
state to the New York Convention. These clauses would expressly waive any
objection to the competence of such courts, including without limitation defenses
based on lack of personal jurisdiction or the absence of property in the recognition
forum. The drafters might go on to provide that neither side will, on the basis of
forum non conveniens or similar notions, seek dismissal of a motion for award
confirmation. Simpler clauses might state that both parties consent to the personal
jurisdiction of any court where award recognition may be sought.

IV. WHENCE AND WHITHER
Assuming damages can be proven, breach of obligations under the New York
Convention may in some instances give rise to an actionable claim under a
bilateral investment treaty. As in other areas of the law, much will depend on the
factual configuration of the particular case.
The recent decision in Saipem v. Bangladesh illustrates how disruption of an ICC
arbitration, allegedly in breach of a New York Convention obligation, can also
implicate a bilateral investment treaty that gives direct rights to the prevailing
party. By contrast, much judicial failure to respect the Convention will likely
remain without practical sanction. Such seems to be the case with respect to the
American decisions that rely on parochial notions of jurisdiction and discretion as
grounds for non-recognition of foreign awards.
Only time will tell whether the international legal order will evolve to accord
new mechanisms to promote respect for the New York Convention. As Rudyard
Kipling (and others) might have written, that is a story for another day.

64

The New York City Bar Report notes at page 4, ‘[Arbitration clauses] provide that the parties consent to
recognition and enforcement of any resulting award in any jurisdiction and waive any defense to recognition
or enforcement based upon lack of jurisdiction over their person or property or based upon forum non
conveniens.’ One can only speculate whether such clauses might one day become as commonplace as ‘consent
to judgment’ clauses in domestic American arbitration. See FAA § 9, providing that in domestic arbitration
the parties must ‘have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award’ and must also
specify the court for entry of judgment. By contrast, FAA § 203 make such stipulations unnecessary for most
international contracts.

